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Concern about the low quality of many economic statistics
relating to developing countries has increased greatly in recent
years (Jerven, 2013a). Key research ﬁndings and policy pre-
scriptions may rest on fundamentally problematic founda-
tions, driving a misleading view of development challenges
and, at worst, misguided development policy. The landscape
of development research is littered with studies relying on
highly incomplete or questionable data, frequently with little
acknowledgment of these limitations. Despite some progress,
an earlier argument from Herrera and Kapur (2007) appears
to still hold signiﬁcant truth: ‘‘Inattentiveness to data quality
is, unfortunately, business as usual. . . there are serious weak-
nesses in many datasets used in cross-country regressions cur-
rently in vogue. . . the data sets, problematic or not, become
acceptable by repetition. . . There is a certain irony in the fact
that a lot of work is devoted to improving methods, but that
work on methods does not necessarily translate into improved
everyday use of data” (p. 366, 382, 383).
These data weaknesses are particularly acute in relation to
data on government revenues. Figures are readily available
from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), and
from a growing array of other oﬃcial international sources.
They are widely used in cross-country statistical analysis.
However, they suﬀer major limitations: very extensive missing
observations; unaccounted diﬀerences between alternative
sources; conﬂicting and ambiguous treatment of revenues
from natural resource extraction; and low transparency. In
addition, the most common measure of overall revenue collec-
tion performance is the ratio of tax collection to GDP. But the
GDP data series are themselves sometimes unreliable. In
response, an increasing number of researchers have con-
structed their own revenue datasets on an ad hoc basis, often
by going back to individual country-level sources and/or by
merging data from multiple overlapping international sources.
This had achieved some important gains. But it has often also48carried major costs: It has reduced the scope for comparison
of results and replication, while many ad hoc datasets have
themselves suﬀered from signiﬁcant errors. Both problems
have often been exacerbated by a troubling lack of trans-
parency.
This article correspondingly introduces the new Interna-
tional Centre for Tax and Development Government Revenue
Dataset (ICTD GRD). It is the outcome of a four-year pro-
cess 1 of analyzing data from all available international data
sources, along with IMF country reports, developing a stan-
dard system for classifying that data, and combining data
from mutually compatible sources into a single research data-
set. It achieves demonstrably large gains in both completeness
and analytical accuracy; and, critically, is both publicly avail-
able and transparent in its construction.
Nor are these abstract gains. While improved data quality is
desirable in and of itself, it also oﬀers the promise that
improved data will drive more reliable research ﬁndings. With
this in mind, the remainder of the paper summarizes a ﬁrst
round of research ﬁndings employing the ICTD GRD, which
collectively illustrate that improved data do, in fact, generate
new and more robust results. These studies have sought to
replicate earlier results in several widely explored research
areas: (a) tax and aid, (b) tax revenue, non-tax revenue and
democracy, (c) electoral cycles and taxation, and (d) taxationFinal revision accepted: November 6, 2015.
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new data adds substantial depth to earlier ﬁndings. In the
other two cases employing the new data yields substantially
new ﬁndings, to the point of calling earlier ﬁndings into ques-
tion. More simply, the results illustrate, in stark terms, the
value of ICTD GRD speciﬁcally, but also the broader impor-
tance for development research of much greater attention to
data quality.
The paper proceeds as follows. The ﬁrst three sections high-
light the limitations of earlier data and the construction of the
ICTD GRD. The fourth section provides an extended over-
view of the initial set of studies employing the new data, high-
lighting the new research results—and policy implications—
that result. The ﬁnal section notes some remaining limitations
of the ICTD GRD, and reﬂects on the lessons that it provides
for eﬀorts to strengthen development data more broadly.2. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES
Researchers have long been troubled by the weaknesses of
cross-country revenue data. The most widely used source prior
to the public release of the ICTD GRD was the IMF GFS,
which assembles oﬃcial revenue and expenditure data from
governments across the world. However, sharp limitations of
the IMF GFS for research purposes have been increasingly
recognized, with even IMF researchers turning elsewhere.
The most important limitations of the GFS for research pur-
poses fall into three categories: Inadequate data coverage,
inconsistent treatment of natural resource revenues, and
inconsistent GDP data employed to calculate tax-to-GDP
ratios. 2
With respect to data coverage, the IMF GFS suﬀers from
extensive missing data, as data coverage amounts to only
roughly 65 per of potential country-year observations for the
period 1990–2010, and declines further for lower-income
countries and in earlier years. This missing data are non-
random, and often concentrated in countries experiencing
instability, weak governance, or a poor relationship with inter-
national organizations, and thus risks generating misleading
results. 3
Additional concerns are raised by inconsistent and analyti-
cally problematic treatment of revenues from the exploitation
of non-renewable natural resources. In general, countries record
corporate taxes paid by private sector resource companies as
taxes, while recording royalties, export taxes, proﬁt sharing,
the proﬁts of state-owned enterprises, and similar revenues,
as non-tax revenue. However, while these distinctions may
be accurate from a pure accounting standpoint, they do not
appear to be strictly adhered to; and, critically, they obscure
the analytical distinctions relevant to most academic research.
Researchers are most often interested in the substantive
distinction between what Moore (1998) terms ‘‘earned” and
‘‘unearned” income. ‘‘Earned income” refers broadly to non-
resources taxes, which are raised on a relatively broad base,
are not a payment for a speciﬁc service and generally require
a measure of negotiation with the population as well as the
construction of complex tax bureaucracies. By contrast, ‘‘un-
earned income” refers to natural resource revenues and other
non-tax revenues that come from comparatively captive and
concentrated sources, making collection relatively low cost
and independent of local populations. When researchers speak
of ‘‘tax revenue” they are most often interested in non-resource
tax revenue. However, the IMF GFS, like most other sources,
does not allow a consistent distinction between resource and
non-resource sources of tax revenue.Individual country examples serve to highlight these distinc-
tions. When employing data from the IMF GFS, Angola
reports tax collection ranging from 30% to 50% of GDP
depending on the year—among the highest in the world. How-
ever, while accurate in an accounting sense, this is deeply mis-
leading for much research: non-resource tax revenue amounts
to around 5% of GDP in Angola—among the lowest in the
world. This type of discrepancy is not uncommon across
resource-rich states. In Iran prior to 1990, petroleum revenues
were recorded as tax revenue in the IMF GFS. Post-1990, the
same petroleum revenues are recorded as non-tax revenue.
While the IMF warns explicitly against merging these pre-
and post-1990 data series, some researchers have done so. In
all such cases there is a major risk of highly misleading data
generating unreliable research results.
Finally, many studies that rely on the IMF GFS—as well as
other sources—have been undermined by inconsistent GDP ser-
ies employed to calculate tax ratios. The root of these problems
lies particularly, though not exclusively, in the irregular re-
basing of GDP calculations in much of the developing world,
which has resulted in the dramatic underestimation of GDP
in many countries prior to rebasing. This has resulted in dra-
matic increases in recorded GDP—sometimes amounting to
50% ormore—following rebasing exercises. Rebasing inGhana
in 2010 resulted in a 60% ‘‘increase” in GDP, while rebasing in
2014 in Zambia and Nigeria resulted in ‘‘increases” of 25% and
90%, respectively. 4 These episodes highlight the importance of
regular rebasing, but also a much greater risk: international
sources reportingGDP for the same country, but using diﬀerent
base years, can result in huge jumps in GDP from one year to
the next (Jerven, 2013b), and correspondingly sharp (and
entirely illusory) declines in tax-to-GDP ratios as a result.
This has been true, for example, of the IMF International
Finance Statistics (IFS). At the time of writing, combining
tax data from the IMF GFS with GDP data from the IMF
IFS (as has been common) yields a tax to GDP ratio for
Ghana of over 20% in 2005 (pre-rebasing) and less than 13%
in 2006 (post-rebasing). In Iran GDP similarly became pro-
gressively underestimated over the course of the 1980s, leading
the tax to GDP ratio reﬂected by international statistics to rise
from 26% in 1982 to 119% in 1989. Meanwhile, data for Iran
in 1990 witness two shifts: reliance on an updated and more
realistic GDP series, and a move from recording petroleum
revenue as tax revenue to recording it as non-tax revenue.
The result: a fall in the recorded tax to GDP ratio from
119% to less than 6% in a single year.
These are, of course, extreme examples, but they are repre-
sentative of more widespread, though less extreme, issues.
They are, as importantly, indicative of insuﬃcient attention
to data quality in much existing research, and of the need
for transparency of research datasets and their construction
in order to weed out such potential problems.3. RESEARCHERS’ DATASETS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS
The problems noted so far have not gone entirely unnoticed.
In response, researchers have increasingly relied either on
regional sources, which often oﬀer more complete data within
a smaller subset of countries, or on ad hoc researcher datasets,
which merge diﬀerent data sources, clean existing data and/or
draw on country-level sources in order to achieve improve-
ments. However, these initiatives have ultimately failed to
suﬃciently address existing challenges, and highlight the
importance of more comprehensive strategies.
50 WORLD DEVELOPMENTReliance on regional datasets has been the most straight-
forward response. Regional datasets from the OECD, the
Comisio´n Econo´mica para Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe
(CEPAL), and the African Economic Outlook (AEO) all
oﬀer more complete coverage within their speciﬁc regions.
However, they are also characterized by signiﬁcant limita-
tions. Most obviously, regional datasets are limiting for
research questions more usefully addressed using a global
sample, and they limit comparability across studies. A num-
ber of less obvious issues also arise. First, regional datasets
often report on total tax revenues, but fail to record non-
tax revenue and, by extension, total government revenue,
thus providing an incomplete picture of government rev-
enues. 5 Second, the regional datasets generally suﬀer from
the same limitations as the IMF GFS in relation to the clas-
siﬁcation of natural resource revenues. Third, the AEO data-
set in particular lacks clarity about underlying sources of
both tax and GDP data, while a signiﬁcant part of the data
matches other international sources only very imperfectly.
Finally, small diﬀerences in method across sources reduce
direct comparability. For example, revenue is categorized
somewhat diﬀerently between the CEPAL tax dataset and
the OECD Revenues Statistics in Latin America dataset for
some countries—despite covering the same countries, and
being based on the same underlying data.
The alternative to regional datasets has been comparatively
ad hoc eﬀorts by researchers themselves to construct new data-
sets by merging data from multiple sources and/or relying on
country-level sources. These datasets have oﬀered notable ben-
eﬁts, but have failed to fully address key limitations of avail-
able data. While individual datasets achieve signiﬁcant gains
in coverage (e.g., IMF, 2011) and in the consistent treatment
of natural resource revenues (e.g., Haber & Menaldo, 2011;
Keen & Mansour, 2009), none achieve these two goals simul-
taneously. 6 Meanwhile, these ad hoc datasets have generated
signiﬁcant new concerns. The proliferation of alternative data-
sets has further reduced comparability across studies, while
making replication and veriﬁcation diﬃcult or impossible.
This is particularly true where researchers have merged data
from multiple sources, but without careful documentation of
those changes. 7 This has been exacerbated by the fact that
many of the datasets have not been made publicly available,
thus preventing easy replication and dramatically increasing
the risk of unintentional errors in data construction, given
the absence of external scrutiny. 8
The best illustration of the potential and pitfalls of privately
held research datasets has been a dataset constructed by the
IMF Fiscal Aﬀairs Department (IMD FAD). The core aim
of the IMF FAD dataset was to ﬁll gaps in the IMF GFS
dataset by drawing on additional international sources, most
notably the OECD, the World Economic Outlook, and IMF
Article IV reports. 9 The approach was superﬁcially sound:
Where the preferred source was not available, missing data
points would be ﬁlled by drawing on the ‘‘next best” alterna-
tive source. The result was a dataset that achieved dramati-
cally improved data coverage, and which became the basis
for both research papers (e.g., Benedek, Crivelli, Gupta, &
Muthoora, 2014) and oﬃcial IMF FAD publications (e.g.,
IMF, 2011).
However, analysis undertaken during the construction of
the ICTD GRD revealed three major issues. First, and by
design, the FAD dataset did not seek to arrive at a common
treatment of natural resource revenues, and thus suﬀers from
the same inconsistencies and analytical limitations as the
IMF GFS and other sources. Second, the FAD dataset failed
to address problems with underlying GDP series, and thusoccasionally witnessed large breaks in the data series resulting
from GDP rebasing. 10
Third, and most worryingly, the merging of data from mul-
tiple sources inadvertently introduced signiﬁcant inconsisten-
cies and jumps in the data series. 11 The basic assumption
underlying the IMF FAD dataset’s construction was that dif-
ferent sources were always mutually compatible; that is, where
there was a missing data point in one dataset it could be
replaced from an alternative source. However, this basic
assumption does not hold, and has plagued other researcher
datasets as well. In many cases diﬀerent sources report diﬀer-
ent data in overlapping years owing to diﬀerences in, among
others, methodology and classiﬁcation, the level of govern-
ment being considered, the treatment of natural resources,
the treatment of social contributions, and underlying GDP
series. By failing to systematically account for these inconsis-
tencies, the merging process introduced jumps in the data large
enough to call any related research ﬁndings into question.
Meanwhile, the fact that the dataset was not publicly available
almost certainly contributed to these weaknesses remaining
overlooked—even as the dataset provided the basis for high
proﬁle and inﬂuential research ﬁndings.
To their credit, the IMF FAD were eventually willing to
share the data with us, and to engage with us during construc-
tion of the ICTD GRD. More importantly, as this article was
being ﬁnalized the FAD made an updated version of their
internal research dataset public for the ﬁrst time, newly named
the World Revenue Longitudinal Dataset (WoRLD). The
decision was long in coming, but marked an important step
forward in seeking to make research data more transparent,
widely available, and subject to public scrutiny. 12 The
WoRLD dataset also included important improvements over
earlier iterations of the FAD dataset, including reducing the
number of breaks in the data series and employing a consistent
GDP series, similar to the ICTD GRD. However, despite
important advances, the new dataset still falls signiﬁcantly
short of the ICTD GRD as of the time of writing. Most nota-
bly, it does not seek to address the treatment of resource rev-
enues, there remain signiﬁcant breaks in the data series when
incompatible sources are merged, and the total data coverage
remains about 15% less complete than the ICTD GRD.
Simply put, while somewhat improved, the IMF WoRLD
continues to suﬀer signiﬁcant limitations, while the ICTD
GRD remains by a signiﬁcant measure the best source of data
for most types of research. 13
The purpose of highlighting the limitations of the earlier
IMF FAD dataset, and the more recent WoRLD dataset, is
not to ‘‘expose” earlier failures. The goal, instead, is to illus-
trate broader issues related to data quality, and the corre-
sponding integrity of research ﬁndings. Despite the best
intentions, ad hoc eﬀorts to construct new datasets—of which
there have been many examples—pose enormous risks. These
risks are dramatically ampliﬁed when, as has been common,
these datasets are not made publicly available for external
scrutiny. In practice, existing eﬀorts have failed to suﬃciently
improve the data foundation for tax and development
research, and in some respects may have in fact made the sit-
uation worse through the proliferation of alternative datasets.
The recent public release of the IMF WoRLD dataset is very
encouraging as a signal about future engagement and trans-
parency. But its limitations reinforce the argument here about
the importance of transparency and external scrutiny, and
reaﬃrm the overall limitations of available data for tax
research. It is these limitations that have motivated the cre-
ation of the ICTD GRD, and its emphasis on public availabil-
ity and external scrutiny.
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Figure 2. Ghana: Total tax as% of source-specific GDP. Source: Data
compiled by the authors.
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DEVELOPMENT GOVERNMENT REVENUE DATASET
The construction of the ICTD GRD was initiated in late
2010 to address the most glaring weaknesses of existing inter-
national data sources, and thus oﬀer a more reliable founda-
tion for cross-country research. Critically, the goal from the
outset was to rapidly make the data publicly available, in
order to encourage research based on a common data founda-
tion, amenable to comparison and replication, and in order to
invite external use and scrutiny as a means to protect against
errors.
The ICTD GRD has been constructed by systematically
merging, cleaning, and reshaping data from multiple interna-
tional and country-level sources, in order to maximize cover-
age while removing errors associated with existing sources.
While this approach mirrors some existing eﬀorts—most nota-
bly the work of the IMF FAD described above—the ICTD
GRD is signiﬁcantly more ambitious, transparent, and pre-
cisely implemented. Construction of the dataset involved ﬁve
key stages, which are described brieﬂy here, and in greater
detail in Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall (2014).
First was the creation of a standard revenue classiﬁcation
into which data from diﬀerent sources could be incorporated.
Five elements are worth highlighting. First, the classiﬁcation is
extensive: It includes all of the major tax categories from the
IMF GFS. Second, it includes both tax revenue and total gov-
ernment revenue, thus oﬀering a complete view of the ﬁscal
resources of governments. Third, it includes aggregate cate-
gories for direct and indirect taxes, as well as their subcompo-
nents. These aggregate categories allow slightly more complete
time series, and overcome potential inconsistency within and
across countries in allocating revenue across the subcompo-
nents of direct and indirect taxes. Fourth, and most critically,
the classiﬁcation systematically distinguishes between non-
resource tax revenue and revenue from non-renewable natural
resources. And, ﬁfth, the classiﬁcation reports data inclusive
and exclusive of social contributions, in order to accommodate
diﬀerences in reporting across sources.
The second stage was to compile data from all major inter-
national sources into this standard format, as a precursor to
merging that data into a ‘‘ﬁrst choice” composite dataset. This
included data from the IMF GFS, the OECD Tax Statistics,
the OECD Revenue Statistics in Latin America, CEPAL, the
African Economic Outlook Africa Tax Dataset, the World
Bank World Development Indicators, and the Michigan Ross
World Tax Database. Alongside these datasets, we also man-
ually collected data from every publicly available IMF Article
IV report. Critically, the Article IV reports often contain more0%
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Figure 1. Additional data coverage using Article IV data: Albania 1992–2009. S
CG denotes Central Government data adetailed data than do international datasets—particularly with
respect to natural resource revenues—and also often contain
data for country years that are not covered by the IMF
GFS and other available sources, as illustrated in Figure 1. 14
The third and most challenging step lay in merging data
from these multiple sources in order to arrive at a more com-
plete and analytically accurate ‘‘ﬁrst choice” dataset. In prin-
ciple, this is a straightforward task: Employ data from a
‘‘baseline source” where appropriate, and then ﬁll gaps in that
series where necessary from alternative sources. However, in
practice signiﬁcant discrepancies across sources means that
such mechanistic merging generates major breaks in the data
series, as with the original IMF FAD dataset, described above.
As such, the process is necessarily manual: Inspection of all
available data for a given country, selection of the best avail-
able ‘‘baseline” source for the country, and ﬁlling gaps using
other sources if, and only if, the sources are clearly compati-
ble. In general, the ‘‘best” source in this context is the one
which best combines temporal coverage, detailed data disag-
gregation, and consistency with other sources.
The only partial exception is in resource-rich countries,
where there is a need to rely only on sources that oﬀer clear
disaggregation between the resource and non-resource compo-
nents of tax revenue. In practice, this signiﬁcantly reduces the
range of potential sources for resource-rich countries, and the
ICTD GRD dataset draws overwhelmingly on IMF Article IV
reports, which oﬀer the most consistent disaggregation. 15
Meanwhile, the non-resource tax revenue variable is left miss-
ing where the resource component of tax revenue cannot be
isolated, as a missing data point is preferable to one that is
clearly misleading.2004 2006 2008
Art. IV (GG)
GFS (GG)
GFS (CG)
GFS (CG+SS)
Michigan Ross 
WTD
WB
ource: Data compiled by the authors. GG denotes General Government data,
nd SS denotes social contributions.
52 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThe result is the successful closing of ‘‘gaps” in individual
data series, as illustrated in Figure 2. However, Figure 2 also
reveals sharp diﬀerences across sources in the levels of the
tax to GDP ratio. This is driven by diﬀerence in the underlying
GDP series. As discussed earlier, employing source-speciﬁc
GDP series when merging data from multiple sources can lead
to major inconsistencies, the worst of which result from a fail-
ure to update historical GDP series following GDP rebasing
exercises.
These discrepancies motivated the fourth step in the process:
the construction of a standard GDP series that would smooth
these diﬀerences. Rather than relying on source-speciﬁc
GDP series, all of the tax ﬁgures were compiled in local cur-
rency units and merged with a common GDP series, which
relied on a single, and most up-to-date, GDP base year for
each country. This common GDP series was drawn primarily
from the WEO database, with missing data occasionally ﬁlled
from other sources where we could verify that the GDP series
were compatible. 16 The result is illustrated in comparing
Figure 2, above, with Figure 3, below: the resolution of large
apparent discrepancies in tax ratios across countries.
Finally, most existing studies have drawn exclusively on cen-
tral government data, which are comparatively widely avail-
able. However, central government data vastly understate
actual government revenue in comparatively decentralized
countries. As such, the ICTD GRD also gathers general
government (the sum of national, state and local) data
wherever available. In turn, the ﬁnal dataset employs general
government data for more decentralized countries, while con-
tinuing to employ central government data for comparatively
centralized countries (which generally do not report subna-
tional data). While this approach moderately underestimates
government revenue in centralized states, this is far preferable0%
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Figure 3. Ghana: Total tax revenue as% common GDP series. Source: Data
compiled by the authors.
Table 1. ICTD GRD data coverage, relative to other source, 1990–2010 Source:
observations captured
I
All Developing countries Total revenues
Total tax
Tax on income, proﬁt, and capital gains
Tax on goods and services
All countries Total revenues
Total tax
Tax on income, proﬁt, and capital gains
Tax on goods and servicesto the large errors implied by relying solely on central govern-
ment data. 17
The end result is a dataset that is signiﬁcantly more com-
plete and analytically accurate than previous options. The
new dataset covers almost 70% more developing country
observations than the IMF GFS (Table 1), and addresses
the major sources of inaccuracy in earlier datasets: inconsis-
tent treatment of natural resources, inconsistent GDP ﬁgures,
problematic merging of data, and lack of attention to sub-
national revenue. And, as critically, the dataset, includ-
ing details of its construction and revisions, is publicly
available.
In turn, these improvements in the data yield clearer insights
into global trends in tax collection than has previously been
the case—and, again, this is particularly true for developing
countries. While these trends are covered in greater detail else-
where (Prichard, Cobham et al., 2014), a few key messages
warrant particular attention.
First, the ICTD GRD reveals consistent increases over time
in non-resource tax collection in the developing world, across
all regions. While this broad message has been highlighted in
earlier IMF reports (e.g., IMF, 2011), the higher quality data
available from the ICTD GRD reveals a clearer and more pro-
nounced trend (Figure 4). Meanwhile, consistent with most
commentary on the topic, the data reveal that the largest
increases in collection have come from expanded taxation of
goods and services, while trade taxes have declined signiﬁ-
cantly. That said, the data reveal signiﬁcant gains in direct
taxes as well, oﬀering some optimism about the capacity of
developing country tax administrations to tackle these politi-
cally and technically complex taxes (Figure 5).
Second, despite these gains, total tax collection in low-
income countries still very frequently falls below even the min-
imum levels advocated by international organizations. It is has
long been common, though somewhat arbitrary, to suggest
that countries should raise a minimum of 15% of GDP in
domestic tax revenue, and some alternative data sources have
implied that most developing countries have reached this
level. However, by employing a more consistent and up to
date GDP series, and focusing only on non-resource tax
revenue, we ﬁnd that the average level of non-resource tax
collection in low-income countries is only 13% of GDP, with
fully 65 countries collecting less than 15% of GDP in non-
resource taxation. 18 The ICTD GRD data thus highlight
not only recent gains, but the very large challenges that
remain.
Third, the ICTD GRD distinguishes between non-resource
taxation and all other types of revenue, thus making it possible
to compare trends in non-resource tax collection to trends in
the collection of non-tax revenue (which here is taken to
include all resource revenues). This comparison highlights
one of the key arguments in favor of robust domestic taxation:Authors’ calculation. Each cell captures the number of available country-year
by each dataset.
CTD GRD IMF FAD IMF WoRLD IMF GFS WDI
2,317 1,913 2,134 1391 1,060
2,348 1,976 1,876 1,396 1,060
1,900 1,909 1,608 1,395 1,060
1,952 1,856 1,435 1,395 1,060
3,465 3,022 3,130 2,070 1,581
3,513 3,071 2,783 2,091 1,581
2,956 3,040 2,530 2,089 1,581
3,035 3,025 2,262 2,089 1,581
Figure 4. Total Tax Collection as% of GDP by Region. Source: ICTD
GRD (2015). Trend lines include all countries with data available for at
least 15 years during the time period. Date for Eastern Europe and Central
Asia begin in 1997 owing to major data problems during and after the
transition from Soviet control.
Figure 5. Composition of Government Revenue for Developing Countries.
Source: ICTD GRD (2015). Trend lines include all countries with data
available for at least 15 years during the time period.
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2008–09 non-resource tax collection remained relatively stable
across developing countries, and quickly resumed its upward
trend. By contrast, non-tax revenues—of which the most
important and volatile component is resource revenues—de-
clined signiﬁcantly in 2009, with only a very limited recovery
in subsequent years, thus creating signiﬁcant ﬁscal stress in
countries that lacked robust non-resource taxation (Figure 5).5. IMPROVED DATA, NEW RESULTS
The ICTD GRD’s improvements in data coverage and accu-
racy thus oﬀer a more precise descriptive picture of tax collec-
tion around the world. However, a larger question remains
unanswered: does employing better data also produce diﬀerent
and more robust econometric research ﬁndings? With this
question in mind, the remainder of this paper reports theresults of the ﬁrst four studies conducted employing the new
ICTD GRD. Each study began with a simple question: Do
existing research ﬁndings appear to be robust to employing
the new ICTD GRD? Each of the studies correspondingly
revisits well-known research ﬁndings, and employs relatively
standard methods from the existing literature, in order to
explore the empirical beneﬁts of employing improved data. 19
The results make clear the value of the new data. In the ﬁrst
two cases, employing the ICTD GRD casts doubt on the
robustness of earlier ﬁndings (relating to aid and taxation,
and to the impact of elections on tax collection). In the third
case, the new data help to resolve a long-running empirical
controversy about the existence of a ‘‘political resource curse”,
with the new results signiﬁcantly more consistent than earlier
studies. Finally, in the fourth case the new data make it possi-
ble to explore new dimensions of the relationship between tax
structure and growth, and to uncover important new ﬁndings.6. AID AND DOMESTIC TAX EFFORT
Over the past decade, research looking at the impact of for-
eign aid on domestic tax collection has generated sharply con-
ﬂicting ﬁndings. It has focused on a straightforward
hypothesis: Countries that receive higher levels of foreign
assistance will collect less domestic tax revenue, owing to
weaker incentives to pursue politically costly local tax collec-
tion. This highly intuitive possibility found its strongest early
support in work by Gupta, Clemens, Pivovarsky, and
Tiongson (2004). These IMF authors published inﬂuential
econometric results demonstrating that foreign grants have a
negative impact on domestic tax collection, while loans—
which eventually need to be repaid—have a positive impact
on tax collection. The ﬁnding was not only of academic
interest, but had major policy implications. It oﬀered support
to policy voices calling for greater reliance on loans rather
than grants in delivering foreign assistance, and for the
expansion of donor conditionality targeting increased tax col-
lection in order to oﬀset the negative incentive eﬀects of
grants. 20
However, skepticism about these research ﬁndings was
immediate, prompting a range of subsequent studies. At least
one such study replicated the negative impact of grants specif-
ically (Thornton, 2014), while others oﬀered support for a gen-
erally negative impact of aid on tax collection (Bra¨utigam &
Knack, 2004; Remmer, 2004). However, other studies pre-
sented evidence that there was likely no consistent eﬀect of
aid on domestic tax collection (Clist & Morrissey, 2011), or
that any relationship was contingent on the quality of institu-
tions in recipient countries (Brun, Chambas, & Guerineau,
2008). These initial results sparked a subsequent round of
studies, and continued disagreement. Members of the original
team from the IMF—along with new collaborators—em-
ployed the newly created IMF FAD dataset, described above,
to revisit the results. They again reported a negative impact of
grants on tax collection, and a positive impact of loans—
though both smaller in magnitude than in their original study
(Benedek et al., 2014). These results again elicited an immedi-
ate response. Carter (2013) argued that the results were not
robust to more appropriate econometric methods, while
Clist (2014) found that the results could not be fully replicated
using the listed data sources, which he attributed in part to sig-
niﬁcant errors—described earlier—in the IMF FAD
dataset. 21
The ﬁndings reported in Clist (2014) in particular suggest
that data problems may be critical to explaining divergent
54 WORLD DEVELOPMENTﬁndings across studies. 22 They also hold a more subtle lesson:
Continued empirical disagreement has been facilitated by each
set of researchers employing their own datasets, while the
Benedek et al. (2014) dataset was not made publicly available.
With this in mind, Morrissey, Prichard, and Torrance (2014)
and Morrissey and Torrance (2015) re-examine the relation-
ship between aid and taxation employing the ICTD GRD.
The former employs four-year averaged tax data, in order to
smooth year-to-year shocks, while the latter employs annual
data. Both studies are based on a standard model speciﬁca-
tion:
LnðTax RevenueitÞ ¼ b0 þ b1gdppcit þ b2agrit þ b3indit þ b4importsit
þ b5exportsit þ b6Aidit þ b7Aid2it þ eit
ð1Þ
In the model, tax revenue is a function of a set of standard
determinants of tax collection, and of the level of aid. Both
studies include a squared aid term to account for potential
non-linearity, while the aid term is also broken into its compo-
nent parts, grants, and loans. The model is tested employing
both contemporaneous levels of aid, and a one-period lag of
the aid variable. The contemporaneous version is favored by
Benedek et al. (2014), but the lagged version is preferred by
most other studies, based on a belief that, because tax collec-
tion changes slowly, high levels of aid are more likely to aﬀect
levels of tax collection one or more years in the future.
Having established the model, the authors test the relation-
ship using a range of econometric methods from the existing
literature. 23 Reﬂecting a focus on assessing the robustness
of earlier ﬁndings, they focus on comparatively straightfor-
ward models: ﬁxed eﬀects, a lagged dependent variable
(LDV) model with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
and Feasible Generalized Least Squares. The most recent
study by Benedek et al. (2014) also argues for employing the
System-GMM estimator in order to account for possible
endogeneity. This approach has been criticized elsewhere
(Carter, 2013), but it is widely used, and is thus also tested.
While constraints of space do not allow for a full review of
the results, the basic message from both studies is straightfor-
ward: There is no consistently signiﬁcant relationship between
aid and tax collection. Morrissey et al. (2014) ﬁnd that in the
speciﬁcations where they are signiﬁcant, net aid, grants, and
loans are more often positively associated with government
tax revenues, although the signiﬁcance is often weak and not
robust. This is true when using either contemporaneous or
lagged aid variables, and is true when the sample is restricted
to countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The study also demonstrates more directly the value of the
improved data. Existing studies have asked whether access
to aid reduces tax eﬀort, but have not included a right-hand-
side variable to account for the impact of access to non-tax
revenue—including natural resource revenues—on tax collec-
tion. This is a surprising omission, given widespread evidence
that natural resource wealth reduces tax collection (Crivelli &
Gupta, 2014). This implies a signiﬁcant risk of omitted vari-
able bias in all earlier results, which appears to have been dri-
ven entirely by the inadequacy of available data. In any event,
the ICTD GRD allows for the inclusion of a control for non-
tax revenue and, as expected, it is negative and highly signiﬁ-
cant in all of the econometric models. Because the results are
in any case generally insigniﬁcant across speciﬁcations, adding
this new variable does not alter the broad pattern. However,
the absence of this critical variable from earlier studies again
points to problems of robustness arising from inadequate
data.
Ultimately, the results indicate that earlier IMF results are
highly sensitive to choices about data and econometric speciﬁ-cation. In turn, access to the ICTD GRD allows a common
foundation for interrogating this sensitivity, and suggests that
earlier ﬁndings of a signiﬁcant relationship are likely mislead-
ing. This is quite intuitive: Foreign aid may sometimes create
disincentives to domestic tax collection, but this eﬀect is likely
to be muted by several factors. ‘‘Foreign aid” is a hugely
diverse category. Much aid does not go directly to recipient
governments, and is anyway an imperfect substitute for
own-revenue in the eyes of recipient governments. Meanwhile,
technical assistance, donor conditionality, and related pressure
for the expansion of services may all generate a countervailing
positive impact of aid on tax collection. Through access to
improved data, this more nuanced relationship is brought to
the fore.7. ELECTORAL CYCLES AND TAXATION
While less controversial than debates over aid and taxation,
there has been similar disagreement within the existing litera-
ture about the impact of elections on pre-election tax collec-
tion. Models of ‘‘political budget cycles” predict that tax
collection will decline—and public spending will increase—
prior to elections, as opportunistic politicians seek to secure
short-term political support (Drazen, 2001). This possibility
has spawned a large set of cross-country studies.
With respect to public spending, there has been signiﬁcant
agreement that elections do, in fact, spur increased pre-
election spending, with a somewhat larger eﬀect in the gener-
ally weaker institutional environments of developing countries
(de Haan & Klomp, 2013). 24 By contrast, there has been little
agreement about taxation. Several studies have found that
elections increase pre-election spending but have no impact
on pre-election revenue collection (e.g., Brender & Drazen,
2005). This is presumed to reﬂect the comparative diﬃculty
and cost of short-term reductions in taxation. 25 By contrast,
a recent study by Ehrhart (2013) reports evidence that elec-
tions have had a negative impact on pre-election tax collec-
tion, amounting to about 0.2% of GDP, and concentrated
among more broad-based indirect taxes.
However, there are again grounds for concerns about data
quality, reﬂected in two illustrative examples. The most widely
cited evidence that elections do not reduce pre-election tax col-
lection comes from Brender and Drazen (2005), who draw on
panel data from the IMF covering 68 countries from 1960 to
2001. To their signiﬁcant credit, they noted the imperfections
of IMF data, attempted to ‘‘clean” the data, and, most nota-
bly, made their dataset publicly available along with careful
documentation. However, their data nonetheless suﬀer from
many of the issues noted here: limited coverage of low-
income countries, imperfect treatment of natural resources,
unexplained jumps in the data series from one year to the next,
and limited comparability to other studies. The more recent
study from Ehrhart (2013) faces similar issues. Recognizing
the limitations of existing data, she constructs a ‘‘cleaned”
dataset of 56 developing countries from a combination of
the IMF GFS and IMF Article IV reports. However, there
remains signiﬁcant missing data, while, unlike Brender and
Drazen (2005), she did not post the data publicly, nor provide
detailed documentation.
Collectively, these limitations motivated Prichard (2014, in
press) to revisit these earlier ﬁndings using the ICTD GRD,
in order oﬀer more robust evidence based on more complete
and transparent data. Following the literature, the study
employs a simple model in which tax collection is a function
of a battery of standard control variables, X, ﬁxed eﬀects, a,
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election, Election:
Taxi;t ¼ uTaxi;tl þ b1Electioni;t þ X 0i;t1dþ ai þ kt þ ei;t ð2Þ
The model is, again following the literature, tested using
both a standard ﬁxed-eﬀects model and the System-GMM
estimator. The results are unambiguous, ﬁnding no consistent
evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant impact of elections on
pre-election tax collection. This remains true using both esti-
mators, over diﬀerent time periods, employing diﬀerent sub-
sets of countries and when disaggregating total tax collection
between direct and indirect taxes. Simply put, the new results
suggest that the statistically signiﬁcant results reported by
Ehrhart (2013) are highly sensitive to the completeness and
quality of the data.
However, the value of the improved ICTD GRD data lies
not only in re-evaluating existing results, but making it possi-
ble to push existing analysis further. To this end, Prichard
(2014, in press) subsequently asks whether speciﬁc types of
elections have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on pre-election
tax collection, even if elections in general do not. The results
indicate that competitive elections (in which the winning party
receives less than 60% of legislative seats) are unique in having
a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on pre-election tax
collection. 26 This ﬁnding is, again, robust to a wide range of
alternative choices about data and sample. This ﬁnding is
not only relevant to understanding taxation, but also has
implications for democratic theory, by implying that more
competitive elections have a stronger impact on the incentives
of political leaders. The bottom line, again, is that access to the
new data makes it possible to reassess earlier results and to
open up new lines of research inquiry—while making all of
those new results open to replication and scrutiny.8. TAXATION, NON-TAX REVENUE, AND
DEMOCRACY
The relationship between tax revenue, non-tax revenue (pri-
marily from non-renewable natural resource revenues), and
democracy is another research question that has elicited
high-proﬁle disagreement across an expansive range of cross-
country econometric studies. And, again, recent research
employing the ICTD GRD suggests that this disagreement
has, at least in part, been driven by the weaknesses of previ-
ously available government revenue data.
Research in this area has centered on the existence (or not)
of the so-called ‘‘political resource curse”. That is, on the pos-
sibility that governments with access to extensive revenues
from non-renewable natural resources are less likely to be
democratic than those that rely primarily on raising tax rev-
enue from their own citizens. Governments with access to
extensive ‘‘unearned” revenue from captive natural resources
have weaker incentives to be accountable: They have less need
to secure revenue from, and thus to bargain with, their citi-
zens, while they have extensive revenue to invest in repression
or in purchasing political support through public services,
transfers, and patronage. By contrast, a government reliant
on local tax revenue has incentives to be more accountable
in order to encourage ‘‘quasi-voluntary” tax compliance, while
it is likely to face greater demands for reciprocity from citizens
interested in ensuring that their tax payments are used eﬀec-
tively.
The clarity of the hypothesized relationship appears to make
this question particularly amenable to cross-country econo-
metric testing, and such studies have dominated existingresearch. However, existing studies have yielded highly varied
results. Early results almost universally uncovered the
expected negative relationship between natural resource
wealth and democracy (e.g., Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004;
Ross, 2001, 2004). However, subsequent studies argued that
the ﬁnding was not robust, and that there was, in fact, no sig-
niﬁcant relationship—particularly when focusing on within-
country variation over time (Dunning, 2008; Haber &
Menaldo, 2011; Herb, 2003). These dissenting ﬁndings have,
in turn, been met by further studies reporting a negative
impact of resource wealth on democracy (Andersen & Ross,
2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Wiens, Poast, & Clark, 2014).
Owing to the lack of alternatives, these studies have often
relied on problematic data of two diﬀerent types. Some studies
have relied on highly incomplete and imperfect government
revenue data from the IMF GFS, the WB WDI, and regional
sources, the consequences of which have already been dis-
cussed at length. Meanwhile other studies, recognizing the lim-
itations of available government revenue data, have opted
instead to rely on measures of total resource income—that is,
the total value of resource extraction in a country, which is
more widely available, but only an imperfect proxy for the the-
oretical propositions of interest. Most theories of the political
resource curse center on government revenue: a government
that has greater access to revenue from natural resources is less
likely to be accountable to its citizens, owing to a reduced need
to collect tax revenue from citizens, and access to revenue to
invest in repression and securing support. While resource
income is a plausible proxy for government revenue from nat-
ure resources, the connection is highly imperfect, thus subtly
distorting the research question. 27
Against this background, the ICTD GRD oﬀers a major
step forward, as it allows researchers to implement more direct
tests of the relationship between the composition of govern-
ment revenue and democracy. Prichard, Salardi, and Segal
(2014) correspondingly re-test the most widely cited economet-
ric models from the existing literature using the GRD. As with
the bulk of the literature, they begin with a standard dynamic
speciﬁcation:
Democracyi;t ¼ Democracyi;tl þ b1Tax reli;tl þ X 0i;tlc
þ ai þ kt þ ei;t ð3Þ
In this model, the level of democracy is a function of existing
institutions (the lagged level of democracy), a revenue vari-
able, a battery of control variables—including income, eco-
nomic growth, the existence of conﬂict, and regional
democratic diﬀusion—ﬁxed eﬀects, a, and time dummies, k.
They employ three alternative government revenue variables
to reﬂect slightly diﬀerent theoretical claims. First, they test a
measure of tax reliance, which is the share of non-resource tax
revenue in total government revenue. This captures the idea
that a government that is relatively more dependent on tax
revenue is more likely to be accountable to its citizens. Second,
they split tax reliance into its component parts, non-resource
tax revenue and total non-tax revenue, of which natural
resource revenue is the dominant component across countries.
Both are, following theory, measured as shares of GDP, and
this second set of tests attempts to distinguish the
governance-enhancing beneﬁts of domestic taxation from the
negative impacts on governance of high levels of non-tax rev-
enue, primarily from natural resources.
Reﬂecting the diversity of the existing literature, each of
these relationships is tested using ﬁve alternative econometric
methods: System-GMM, the Common-Correlated Errors
Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran (2006), the
56 WORLD DEVELOPMENTError Correction Mechanism regressions favored by Haber
and Menaldo (2011), and random and ﬁxed eﬀects logit mod-
els, which follow Wiens et al. (2014). Each method has its lim-
itations, thus motivating the decision to test them side-by-side
in order to assess the robustness of the results.
While there is, again, no space to review the results in detail,
they oﬀer relatively consistent support for the existence of a
political resource curse. Both the tax reliance variable and
the variable for total non-tax revenue are statistically signiﬁ-
cant with the expected sign across almost all of the estima-
tions. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the estimates is
relatively large, suggesting that the composition of govern-
ment revenue is a powerful determinant of governance out-
comes. 28 Finally, and critically, the results prove generally
robust to changes in time period, country coverage, control
variables, and the level of government under consideration.
The greater consistency of the results using the ICTD as com-
pared to earlier studies thus oﬀers analytical clarity, and a
clear indication of the value of improved data.
Meanwhile, a series of more speciﬁc tests further supports
the belief that employing higher quality data can contribute
to more reliable ﬁndings. When the time series is extended
back into the 1980s, and thus to include less reliable and com-
plete data, the strength and signiﬁcance of the results gradu-
ally declines. When the results are tested using central
government data exclusively, instead of the more robust ﬁnal
version of the ICTD GRD, again the results are generally
weaker, though still signiﬁcant in most cases. Finally, and
most tellingly, most of the results are more statistically signif-
icant and consistent when employing the ICTD GRD mea-
sures of government revenue than when running the same
tests using the resource income variables from Haber and
Menaldo (2011). In each case, more complete data that better
reﬂects the theoretical propositions of interests yields stronger
results, consistent with claims about the value of the ICTD
GRD.9. TAXATION AND GROWTH
The ﬁnal subject of the initial round of research has been the
relationship between taxation and growth. Existing literature
has, again, focused on a relatively straightforward prediction:
All else equal, growth will be slower in countries that are more
reliant on taxes that are expected to be comparatively econom-
ically distorting: corporate income taxes, personal income
taxes, and trade taxes. 29 The broad proposition that marginal
increases in these taxes is bad for growth has found relatively
consistent support in a series of existing cross-country econo-
metric studies. More strikingly, it has come to be widely
viewed as policy orthodoxy, reﬂected in international support,
led by the IMF and the World Bank, for reductions in income
and corporate tax rates in developing countries, and for
replacing trade taxes with value-added taxes (IMF, 2011). 30
However, the empirical foundation for these views has been
surprisingly limited: cross-country research has been largely
limited to more developed economies, with data limitations
having restricted eﬀorts to explore the relationship in detail
in the developing world.
A survey of the literature by McNabb and LeMay-Boucher
(2014) concludes that only one cross-country study testing the
tax-growth relationship using tax collection data has included
a large range of developing countries. 31 In that study,
Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) employ an ad hoc dataset
created speciﬁcally for their research, which draws on datafrom the IMF GFS, OECD, and CEPAL, and which covers
25 middle-income and 23 low-income countries. However,
while their decision to construct an ad hoc dataset results in
improved data coverage, it comes with all of the costs dis-
cussed previously: lack of comparability and replicability,
and the risk of undetected errors or bias in the sample. Both
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the dataset is not
publicly available. 32
Against this background, McNabb (2014) re-examine the
relationship between tax collection and economic growth
using the ICTD GRD. Following Acosta-Ormaechea and
Yoo (2012), and others, they estimate the impact of revenue-
neutral changes in tax structures on growth. They employ a
Common Correlated Eﬀects Mean Group (CMG) estimator
(Pesaran, 2006), which allows for parameter heterogeneity
and controls for cross-sectional dependencies.
They begin by focusing on the question that has dominated
the relevant literature: Does a revenue-neutral shift away from
consumption taxes in favor of income taxes have a negative
eﬀect on growth? Consistent with Acosta-Ormaechea and
Yoo (2012), they ﬁnd a modest but statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of such a shift: a one percentage point revenue neutral
shift from trade taxes to personal and corporate income taxes
reduces growth by between 0.1% and 0.2% depending on the
speciﬁcation, with increases in personal income taxes having
the largest eﬀect. That said, the results are somewhat inconclu-
sive when the focus is on low-income countries alone, with the
strongest results driven by middle and high-income countries.
The overall results are thus broadly consistent with Acosta-
Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). However, a key advantage of the
ICTD GRD is not only greater completeness and analytical
accuracy, but also the ability to explore a broader range of
questions. With this in mind, McNabb and LeMay-Boucher
explore a second question of particular interest to developing
countries: Have there been signiﬁcant growth beneﬁts associ-
ated with the shift from taxes on international trade to taxes
on domestic goods and services and, most notably, value-
added taxes?
There has been a major shift from trade to consumption
taxes across the developing world over the past two decades,
spurred by advice from the IMF and the World Bank. Yet
while this shift has been pursued largely in order to accelerate
economic growth, McNabb and LeMay-Boucher report no
previous eﬀorts to estimate empirically the impact of this
shift using cross-country methods—in part, it seems, because
of the absence of adequate data. Ultimately, McNabb and
LeMay-Boucher ﬁnd no evidence that the shift from trade
taxes to consumption taxes has enhanced economic growth.
This is striking: Inﬂuential international advice has been pre-
mised in signiﬁcant part on the growth beneﬁts of such a shift,
but the authors ﬁnd no evidence that such growth beneﬁts
have materialized. Taken alongside results from Baunsgaard
and Keen (2005), highlighting the diﬃculty many developing
countries have faced in replacing foregone trade tax revenue,
these results highlight the challenges that have accompanied
trade tax reform in many developing countries.
None of the results reported by McNabb and
LeMay-Boucher (2014) directly challenge or overturn earlier
research ﬁndings. However, their access to high-quality, com-
plete, and publicly available data has allowed them to go
beyond the questions asked by earlier research, and to cast
some doubt on the empirical basis for a key set of IMF policy
recommendations. As importantly, their results are now easily
open to scrutiny and replication, in order to advance policy
research in a way not previously possible.
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Recent years have seen increased public discussion of a so-
called ‘‘statistical tragedy” in developing countries, with inter-
national focus turning to the relative absence and low quality
of development data from many developing countries. It is
increasingly understood that the weaknesses of available data
can result in the neglect of issues that are not well captured by
existing data, diﬃculty in evaluating the eﬀectiveness of devel-
opment interventions, and the potential for misleading
research and policy advice. This has, in turn, carried clear
practical implications. For researchers, a need to exercise
much greater care in working with cross-country data. For
policy makers, the need for more concerted investments in
strengthening existing data, gathering new data, and strength-
ening the capacity of statistical departments, particularly, but
not exclusively, in the developing world (e.g., Jerven &
Johnston, 2015).
Attention to data questions has arisen out of the work of
scholars highlighting the limitations of existing data (e.g.,
Jerven, 2013a), but has also been closely linked to discussion
around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Because
the SDGs aim to cover a much wider range of topics than their
predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals, a spotlight
has been placed on the need for new data against which to
measure progress against key goals. In broad terms, this
enhanced focus on the need for more and better data is extre-
mely welcome, and is consistent with the motivation behind
the ICTD GRD. However, it also carries a risk that the desire
for more data may in practice outweigh the push for better
data—and for ensuring that the data that we have are
deployed with greater caution.
This distinction between more data and better data is central
to the work described in this paper. One of the problems
facing earlier international tax data was of quantity:
cross-country data coverage within the IMF GFS was highly
incomplete, and those gaps undermined the credibility of
cross-country analysis. Researchers responded by taking steps
to ﬁll these gaps by merging data from multiple sources. How-
ever, as they did so the desire for more data sometimes
trumped necessary attention to the quality of that data—and
to how it was being used—with important consequences for
research quality and reliability. These ad hoc datasets too often
included errors, while basic limitations of the data were often
addressed only brieﬂy, if at all. These concerns were reinforced
by a striking lack of transparency. These data problems have, in
turn, shaped potentially misleading but inﬂuential research results.
For this reason, the focus of the ICTD GRD has been as
much on quality as quantity. Like earlier eﬀorts, it has sought
to close gaps in individual international data series by merging
data from multiple sources. However, much greater eﬀort has
gone into ensuring that the merging of that data has been done
with suﬃcient care to avoid errors. This has, as discussed
already, included painstaking manual cleaning of the data,
careful attention to the classiﬁcation of resource revenues,
and eﬀorts to minimize imperfections in underlying GDP ser-
ies. The result is, as demonstrated here, a much-improved
dataset, which has allowed researchers to generate more
reliable ﬁndings. As important, it has created a common plat-
form for like-minded researchers to similarly revisit existing
results—including those reported here—using improved data.While this paper has stressed the beneﬁts of the new dataset,
it remains equally important to stress that, despite these
eﬀorts, the dataset remains imperfect in various ways.
Fundamentally, the ICTD GRD—or any alternative—is only
as good as the underlying data from international sources.
Sometimes data are missing, while we have growing evidence
that these numbers are often imperfect approximations,
compiled by overstretched local and international staﬀ
(Jerven, 2013a). 33 Our eﬀorts to deal with natural resource
revenues have similarly been limited by underlying sources.
A few larger resource producers simply do not distinguish
resource and non-resource revenues, and are thus excluded.
Smaller resource producers often do not report resource rev-
enues separately owing to their relatively small size—a small,
but not entirely negligible, distortion in the resultant data.
Meanwhile, there is not yet an explicit and universally
accepted deﬁnition of ‘‘resource revenues”—though the IMF
is working toward developing one—with some risk that the
categorization of resource revenues varies at the margin across
countries.
There is no evidence that any of these issues are seriously
distorting the data in the ICTD GRD, which is the best
available option for research. However, these continued
limitations are a reminder of the imperfect underlying reality,
and of substantial scope for investing in supporting improved
data collection both nationally and internationally. They also
highlight a broader point: No data are perfect, and when we
speak of data quality we should be speaking not only about
the data itself, but about transparency around the data being
used, and its limitations. The most jarring issue surrounding
much recent tax and development research is not the weak-
ness of the data used, but the fact that the data were not,
in many cases, made publicly available. The absence of such
transparency creates major challenges for scrutinizing
research ﬁndings, and dramatically increases the likelihood
that errors will persist, unidentiﬁed, within researcher data-
sets—even when these are the basis for inﬂuential policy
results.
There is a tendency, due to the proliferation of data and
ease of access to powerful statistical packages, to consider
the present as something of a golden age for data-driven
research. An alternative perspective is, however, to also urge
caution. Imperfect data, handled with insuﬃcient care, and
lacking the potential for replication and scrutiny, create a
risk that the quantity of data-driven research may increase,
but without adequate attention to quality and reliability.
Transparency about the limitations of even the best data is
thus essential in order to ensure that researchers employ ade-
quate data, in a way consistent with its limitations—and cog-
nizant of its imprecisions. Against this background, the best
guarantee of the integrity of the ICTD GRD is that it was
posted publicly online almost as soon as it was created, with
a clear guide to its own limitations. This was accompanied by
eﬀorts (this paper included) to publicize it, to invite public
scrutiny, and to encourage broad and consistent use of a rel-
atively standard data source for tax and development
research. Updating of the dataset to cover recent years,
and address feedback from users, is already underway. The
hope is that these continued eﬀorts will contribute to the
development of more robust research ﬁndings moving for-
ward.
58 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. While the ICTD initiative began in late 2010, two of the creators of the
dataset had been involved in similar eﬀorts dating back almost a decade—
while similar, but less complete, eﬀorts by other researchers date back still
further.
2. These limitations, as well as several comparatively modest issues, are
described at greater length in Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall (2014).
3. The incompleteness of the IMF GFS is, in turn, driven by limited
reporting from member countries, and the fact that the IMF GFS is only
able to publish data where it is deemed to be of very high quality, and
where relatively complete national accounts data can be constructed. As
explained below, this explains the potential to ﬁll gaps in the GFS by
employing IMF Article IV reports, which are moderately less precise, but
far more complete.
4. Jerven (2013b), Cobham (2014), Mukanga (2014), Leo (2014).
5. For CEPAL data total revenue ﬁgures can often be drawn from
alternative national accounts tables, though with risks resulting from
methodological inconsistencies. The African Economic Outlook and the
OECD Revenue Statistics in Latin America oﬀer no ﬁgures for total
government revenue.
6. The best known is that of Keen and Mansour (2009), which draws on
data from IMF Article IV reports in order to construct a complete dataset
for sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980–2006 which distinguishes
natural resource revenues from other types of tax revenue. It has since
been updated (Mansour, 2014). However, despite its many strengths, the
dataset only covers one region, and only covers a small subset of the tax
and revenue variables oﬀered by the IMF GFS, thus limiting its
applications.
7. For example, Ehrhart (2013) tells us that for non-African developing
countries ‘‘the data are taken from the same sources, namely GFS and
Article IV data,” (p. 10) without any further clariﬁcation. In a similar vein,
Garcia and von Haldenwang (2015) draw on a dataset which merges data
from many of the same sources described here, but for which more
detailed information is not readily available.
8. Illustratively, the ICTD GRD, despite requiring three years to
construct, nonetheless beneﬁtted from new users pointing out minor
errors upon its public release in September 2014. Openness to scrutiny,
and to revision, seems an important beneﬁt from publishing datasets with
an engaged, technical audience.
9. The latter primarily indirectly by way of the research dataset
constructed by Keen and Mansour (2009), which draws on data from
Article IV reports.
10. This is true, among others, for Ghana, as discussed earlier.
11. A detailed account of every such ‘‘break” in the data series resulting
from inappropriate merging of data from multiple sources is available on
request from the author.
12. There is a suspicion in many quarters that the decision to revise the
earlier IMF data, and make it public was, in part, a response to the ICTD
GRD, and to the eﬀorts described here to highlight the limitations of the
earlier IMF FAD dataset. That said, this has never been stated explicitly,
and remains speculation.
13. More detailed discussion of the diﬀerences between the ICTD GRD
and IMFWoRLD, as of the time of writing, can be found in Prichard and
McNabb (2015).14. While the exclusion of some Article IV data from the IMF GFS
reﬂect concerns about data quality, we follow much earlier work—
including work at the IMF itself—in concluding that such imprecisions are
generally comparatively negligible. That said, all Article IV data have been
interrogated carefully, and excluded where they are signiﬁcantly at odds
with other sources.
15. In practice, there are also a large number of countries that secure a
very small share of government revenue from non-renewable natural
resources—including many countries home to signiﬁcant, but weakly
taxed, mining sectors. However, there are not any international sources
that systematically distinguish natural resource revenues where resource
revenues are small (normally less than 1% of GDP). In these cases resource
revenue is treated as equal to 0, in order to make the exercise tractable, as
any resultant distortions are comparatively negligible.
16. Speciﬁcally, where GDP ﬁgures from the two sources were equiva-
lent, plus or minus 2.5%, during overlapping years.
17. The dataset also allows users to customize their preferences, while a
version of the data employing central government data exclusively is also
provided to all users, in order to verify the robustness of results. The
results reported below are, in general (a) robust to using only central
government data, but (b) stronger when employing the preferred ICTD
dataset, thus oﬀering support for the approach adopted. The approach
here is also preferable to that employed by the IMF WoRLD dataset,
which often merges central and general government data within the same
country, resulting in sometimes large jumps in the data when transitioning
between sources.
18. While low non-resource tax collection may be a rational policy choice
in some resource-rich states, the majority of the countries below 15% of
GDP—42 in total in the dataset—are not resource rich, and thus simply
struggle to collect adequate revenue.
19. The papers are not precise replications of earlier ﬁndings. This
reﬂects, among other things, the existence of multiple earlier studies in
each area, a desire to consider the most econometrically appropriate
approaches, and, critically, the fact that replication data and ﬁles for most
of the studies were not generally available.
20. Revenue-related conditionality at the IMF did, in fact, increase in
subsequent years, although this cannot be attributed to the impact of this
study alone.
21. The authors of Benedek et al. (2014) subsequently shared their
dataset and it produced results similar to those reported in the published
article, but also conﬁrmed the signiﬁcant discontinuities and errors in the
data noted earlier.
22. Illustrative of the problem, one of the most recent studies, Thornton
(2014), employs incomplete and analytically problematic data from the
IMF GFS, but does not pay any broader attention to data quality beyond
mentioning the existence of extensive missing data.
23. They do not employ instrumental variables analysis, despite it having
been employed in two recent studies (Benedek et al., 2014; Thornton,
2014), owing to lack of conﬁdence in the instruments that have been
employed, and the questionable value of employing complex IV strategies.
Speciﬁcally, instrumental variables analysis is intended to correct for
potential problems of endogeneity. However, in this case any endogeneity
is generally expected to make a negative relationship between aid and
taxation more likely, as countries with low tax capacity may receive higher
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relationship more likely, there is little justiﬁcation for employing
instrumental variables unless other, more straightforward, methods also
suggest a negative relationship—which the papers do not ﬁnd to be the
case. See discussion in Carter (2013, pp. 7–8).
24. There may, of course, also be weakness and concerns with public
expenditure data, though that is not the focus here.
25. Pre-election reductions in tax collection can generally only be
achieved through diﬃcult to reverse changes in tax rates or by intention-
ally relaxing tax enforcement, with potentially negative long-term impli-
cations for the quality of administration.
26. Tests for the eﬀects of contested elections (at least two competing
parties), ﬁrst elections, free and fair elections, and transitional elections are
all consistently insigniﬁcant.
27. Recent studies, by Haber and Menaldo (2011) and Wiens et al.
(2014), acknowledge that a focus on revenues would be theoretically
preferable, but explain that data limitations have led them to focus
primarily on resource income. Haber and Menaldo (2011) acknowledge
this implicitly, as they construct a measure of fiscal reliance—the share of
government revenue from natural resource wealth—but are able to do so
for only 19 countries. Wiens et al. (2014) make their preference for
measures of revenue, rather than resource income, more explicit, writing
that ‘‘ﬁscal reliance best captures our theoretical quantity of interest” (p.
786), while nonetheless employing resource income as the best available
proxy for the variable of interest.28. By contrast, the variable for total tax revenue is comparatively
inconsistent across estimation methods, suggesting either a weaker
relationship or that the relationship is comparatively complex, and
diﬃcult to capture using cross-country methods. The latter possibility is
advanced at length in Prichard (2015).
29. Note that these studies do not, for the most part, ask whether higher
taxes in general are good or bad for growth. They are focused on which
types of taxes are relatively better or worse for growth.
30. Value-added taxes are generally felt to be less economically distorting
than trade taxes, though this claim has been challenged theoretically by
Emran and Stiglitz (2005), who argue that this might not be the case in the
imperfect markets and enforcement environments that characterize
developing countries.
31. Lee and Gordon (2005) also included a wide range of developing
countries in their study of tax and growth, but employ data on statutory
tax rates rather than actual tax collection.
32. McNabb and LeMay-Boucher (2014) were unable to gain access to
the dataset during the course of their research, though Acosta-Ormaechae
later commented favorably on their paper at a workshop in September
2014.
33. Indeed, this is part of why the IMF GFS often does not publish data
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